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THE PHASE-OUT AND SUNSET OF
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
REGULATIONS
INTRODUCTION
roximity to nature, something that most people will trav-
el hours and pay hundreds or thousands of dollars for, is
not something we would ever consider a threat to international
public health. A young boy from a small village in Guinea ap-
peared to feel similarly, as he wandered into his backyard to
play under a tree. The result of which was fever, black stool,
vomiting, and proximate death.1 It was later discovered that
this tree was ridden with bats, which were the likely origin of
the Ebola virus2—the disease that that ultimately killed the
boy’s sister, mother, and grandmother.3
The probable cause of the Ebola virus and subsequent horrif-
ic chain of events is deforestation.4 Scientists assert that defor-
estation in the Gueckedou District of Guinea5 led to increased
contact between humans and wild animals, exposing the local
populations to fatal animal-borne viruses.6 In the case of the
Ebola virus, however, the devastation did not end in the small
village in Guinea. Instead, the virus spread globally, killing
over eleven thousand people in countries spanning from Africa
to the United States and Europe.7
The mounting number of deaths resulting from the 2014 Ebo-
la outbreak sparked a tirade of international responses. More
1. Origins of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 2015),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/one-year-report/virus-origin/en/.
2. Id.
3. Madison Park, Report: Ebola Outbreak Probably Started by 2-Year Old
in Guinea, CNN (Oct. 10, 2014, 10:41 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/health/ebola-patient-zero/.
4. Terrence McCoy, How Deforestation Shares the Blame for the Ebola
Epidemic, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/08/how-
deforestation-and-human-activity-could-be-to-blame-for-the-ebola-pandemic/.
5. Origins of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic, supra note 1.
6. McCoy, supra note 4.
7. Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, CTR. FORDISEASECONTROL
& PREVENTION (Oct. 11, 2015, 8:06 PM),
http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/history/chronology.html.
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specifically, many responses restricted the movement or travel
of individuals. For example, large international airlines, such
as Kenya Airways and British Airways, suspended all flights to
Sierra Leone and Liberia, while Kenya prohibited entry into
the country of persons visiting from Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Guinea.8 Additionally, outside of the African continent, Canada
responded by halting its issuance of travel and permanent res-
idency visas to persons from countries largely affected by the
disease.9
The restrictions put in place during the 2014 Ebola outbreak
were not novel, but were consistent with previous international
responses to global health emergencies. History has dictated
that when the international community is confronted with a
global epidemic that threatens both the health and safety of
the world’s population, it is instinctive to implement health
measures that restrict or halt the movement of both persons
and goods within their country in order to protect their na-
tions from contamination.10 Mechanisms commonly used in
recent epidemics include flight suspension, border closure, and
the deferment of visa issuances.11 These measures were most
notably and widely utilized during the 2003 SARS outbreak
and 2009 H1N1 epidemic. In response to the SARS outbreak,
Russia and Kazakhstan sealed large portions of their borders
with China to prevent any sort of border crossing by air or
land.12 Additionally, the Taipei government halted its issu-
ance of visas to persons visiting from SARS stricken coun-
8. Caelainn Hogan, WHO Cautions Against Ebola-Related Travel Re-
strictions, WASH. POST, (Aug. 19, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/2014/08/19/83da2974-26f2-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
9. Helen Branswell, Ebola Outbreak, CBC NEWS, (Nov. 5, 2014, 11:54
AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/health/ebola-outbreak-visa-limits-need-to-be-
justified-who-tells-canada-1.2824590.
10. See T. Déirdre Hollingsworth et al.,Will Travel Restrictions Control the
International Spread of Pandemic Influenza?, 12 NATURE MED. 5, 497–98
(2006); Poletto C. Gomes et al., Assessing the Impact of Travel Restrictions on
the International Spread of the 2014 West African Ebola Epidemic, 19
EUROSURVEILLANCE, Oct. 2014, at 1, 1.
11. Poletto C. Gomes et al., supra note 10.
12. SUSAN F. MARTIN ET AL., HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANDMIGRATION: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 102 (Susan F. Martin et al. eds. 2014) [here-
inafter HUMANITARIAN CRISES ANDMIGRATION].
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tries,13 while the Ministry of Health in Saudi Arabia prohibited
persons visiting from infected countries from entering the
country.14 Similarly, during the 2009 H1N1 epidemic, China
suspended all direct inbound flights from Mexico, and Slovakia
closed its borders with the Ukraine.15 Needless to say, respons-
es such as these have an impact upon the spread of infectious
disease.16 During times of crisis, however, the residual affects
travel restrictions have upon international trade and human
rights are often overlooked.17
Despite the apparent lack of coordination among the various
measures implemented by individual countries during past inter-
national health emergencies, such responses are currently coordi-
nated by the World Health Organization (WHO), a “specialized
agency” of the United Nations.18 In 2007, the WHO instituted the
International Health Regulations (“IHR” or the “Regulation”) to
provide a framework for coordinating an international response to
infectious disease epidemics that is minimally invasive upon inter-
national trade, traffic,19 and human rights.20 Although this regula-
tion has proven to be effective in several ways, it has also fallen
short.21 Among its various shortcomings, is the IHR’s lack of effec-
tiveness in regulating the use of travel restrictions22 as a measure
13. Taiwan’s SARS Decision a Blow to Asian Airlines, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2003), http://articles.latimes.com/2003/apr/28/business/fi-sarscathay28.
14. Ziad A. Memish & Annelies Wilder-Smith, Global Impact of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, 11 J. TRAVELMED. 127, 128 (2004).
15. HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND MIGRATION, supra note 12, at 104; see Paolo
Bajardi et al., Human Mobility Networks, Travel Restrictions, and the Global
Spread of 2009 H1N1 Pandemic, 6 PLOS ONE, Jan. 2011, at 1, 1.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM SARS 128 (2003),
http://www.iaclea.org/members/pdfs/SARS%20REPORT.Rothstein.pdf.
18. WHO Const. pmbl.
19. For the purposes of this Note, “traffic” will have the same meaning as
it does in the IHR: “the movement of persons, baggage, cargo, containers,
conveyances, goods or postal parcels across an international border, including
international trade.” International Health Regulations (2005), art. 1, June
15, 2007, 2509 U.N.T.S. 44861 [hereinafter IHR (2005)].
20. Id. art 1.
21. See Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Normative Authority of the World
Health Organization, 129 PUB. HEALTH 854, 857 (2015).
22. For the purposes of this Note, “travel restrictions” will refer to flight suspen-
sion and border closure as a manner to prevent the spread of international infec-
tious disease epidemics (“IIDEs”).
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to prevent the spread of infectious disease epidemics,23 which often
produces outcomes adverse to the purpose of the Regulation.24 As
such, this Note proposes that IHR implement a framework of
regulatory provisions that both sunset and phase-out, which
are mechanisms often seen in U.S. tax law. Sunset provisions
are regulations that include a set expiration date and must be
renewed or revised on a specified date or they will discontin-
ue.25 On the other hand, phase-out provisions allow legislators
to vary and refine the actual effect that certain tax code provi-
sions will have upon taxpayers with different circumstances,
including differences in income levels, eligibility for tax bene-
fits, or the amount of losses incurred in the current tax year.26
As such, this Note advocates for the implementation of a
framework of “sunsetting phase-out provisions,” which are pro-
visions that both phase-out and contain a predetermined sun-
set date. This will allow the WHO to more precisely regulate the
manner in which signatories to the IHR (“Member States” or in-
dividually “Member State”) respond to epidemics so that their re-
sponse is both coordinated and tailored to the specific interna-
tional health emergency at issue.
Part I will provide a background of the IHR and the institu-
tional bodies that execute, govern, and support the IHR’s effec-
tive implementation. Part II will analyze the scope and effect of
the IHR, discuss the major themes and values seen throughout
the Regulation, and highlight its major issues that arguably
have an impact on its effectiveness. Part III will explain where
23. See e.g. Statement on the 4th Meeting of the International Health Regu-
lations Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West
Africa, WORLDHEALTHORG. (Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Statement on the 4th
Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ebola-4th-ihr-
meeting/en/.
24. Statement on the 3rd Meeting of the International Health Regulations
Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Statement on the 3rd IHR
EC Meeting Regarding Ebola],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-3rd-ihr-
meeting/en/.
25. John E. Finn, Sunset Clauses and Democratic Deliberation: Assessing
the Significance of Sunset Provisions in Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 442, 445 (2010).
26. Charles S. Hartman, Missed It By That Much—Phase-Out Provisions
in the Internal Revenue Code, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 188 (1996).
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the WHO derives its authority to regulate the use of health
measures by the Member States, and describe in detail the
ways in which the IHR regulates the use of travel restrictions
as a measure to prevent the spread of infectious disease epi-
demics. It will then proceed to summarize the timeline of the
2014 Ebola outbreak, and describe how the WHO responded to
and provided guidance regarding the outbreak and use of trav-
el restrictions. Part IV will propose a solution that involves the
use of sunsetting phase-out provisions as a method to imple-
ment limitations upon the use of travel restrictions as a meas-
ure to prevent the international spread of infectious disease
epidemics. This proposal aims to be consistent with both the
objectives and values of the IHR while also increasing its effec-
tiveness.
I. THE IHR AND ITS SUPPORTING BODIES
The following Part will begin by illustrating the history of the
IHR. It will first explain the origin, role, and significance of the
WHO, World Health Assembly (WHA), and other agencies that
support and interact with both the WHO and the WHA. It will
then explain the circumstances from which the IHR arose and
its history. The Part will then end with a brief analysis of the
themes and values that are seen throughout the Regulation,
and how the IHR balances them to create an idealized frame-
work within which responses to international health crises
should be carried out.
A. The WHO, WHA, and Other Related Agencies
The first International Sanitary Conference was instituted in
1851 in global recognition of the fact that the advancements of
the industrial revolution, while essential to the growing econ-
omy, also presented risks to international public health as a
result of the increased circulation of both persons and goods
around the world.27 This recognition arose more specifically in
27. Charles Clift, The Role of the World Health Organization in the Inter-
national System 14–15 (Ctr. on Glob. Health Sec., Working Paper No. 1,
2013),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Glo
bal%20Health/0213_who.pdf. The first International Sanitary Conference
(the “Conference”) was held in France in 1851 and was composed of partici-
pants from eleven different European countries as well as Turkey. The Con-
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response to the perceived threat that such advancements could
pose to efforts preventing subsequent outbreaks of cholera,28
plague, and yellow fever in Europe.29 As a result, it became es-
sential for any regulation that was implemented to prevent the
spread of infectious disease epidemics to also safeguard against
the potential negative impacts that such regulations could have
upon the newly globalized economy.30 In order to confront this
potential problem, the International Sanitary Conferences
sought to create a framework for preventing the international
spread of infectious diseases without disturbing internation-
al trade.31 These conferences did not lead to an international
treaty for the general protection of international public health,
but instead led to various other treaties of a narrower scope.32
After World War II, international health reemerged as a sem-
inal issue for various countries.33 In 1945, during a conference
for the establishment of the U.N., China and Brazil expressed a
desire to establish an international health organization.34 As a
result, the WHO Constitution was ultimately ratified during
the 1948 International Health Conference.35 The WHO was es-
ference met a total of eleven times spanning from the late nineteenth century
to early twentieth century. Id.
28. Outbreaks of cholera plagued Europe once in 1830 and again in 1847.
Courtney Clegg, The Aviation Industry and the Transmission of Communica-
ble Disease: The Case of H1N1 Swine Influenza, 75 J. AIR L. & COM. 437, 443
(2010).
29. Clift, supra note 27, at 14.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6; see also Origin and Development of Health Cooperation,
WORLD HEALTH ORG.
http://www.who.int/global_health_histories/background/en/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2016). The treaties formulated as a result of the International Sanitary
Conferences were narrower in scope and were named the International Sani-
tary Conventions, which were initially formulated in 1892 and then revised
in 1903. Clift, supra note 27, at 6, 15. The treaties did not result in regulation
that was applicable to any and all IIDEs, but instead specifically addressed
the international response to cholera, plague, and yellow fever. Id. Based on
this influence, the Americas initiated their own International Sanitary Con-
vention of the Americas in 1902, which also promulgated the Pan-American
Sanitary Code in 1905 that required all parties to the treaty to notify each
other of any instances of cholera, plague, or yellow fever. Clegg, supra note
28, at 443.
33. Gostin, supra note 21, at 854.
34. Clift, supra note 27, at 17.
35. Id. at 6; Origin and Development of Health Cooperation, supra note 32.
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tablished as a “specialized agency” under Article 57 of the U.N.
Charter,36 and sought to achieve “the attainment by all peoples
of the highest possible level of health.”37 Soon after, the WHA
was established to serve as the “decision-making body” for the
WHO.38 The WHA annually hosts representatives39 from each
Member State and functions primarily to conduct oversight
of the WHO and its affairs by making policy determinations
and decisions regarding appointments and budgeting. 40 The
WHA is supported and advised by the WHO Executive Board,
which consists of a body of health experts designated by the
Member States. 41 Additionally, the WHO Executive Board
submits both relevant topics of concern and resolutions for con-
sideration by the WHA.42 The WHO Executive Board, subject to
the WHA’s governance, coordinates and executes the policies
established by the WHA.43
The WHO has a number of different Global Alert and Re-
sponse teams (“GARs”) that assist in furthering its purpose to
promote universal public health by providing a variety of sup-
36. WHOCONST. pmbl.
37. Id. art. 1.
38. World Health Assembly, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/ (last visited Feb.
21, 2016); see alsoWHOCONST. art. 18 (describing the functions of the WHA).
See generally World Health Org., Rules of Procedure of the World Health As-
sembly, in BASIC DOCUMENTS (48th ed. 2014) [hereinafter WHO Rules of Pro-
cedure], http://www.who.int/governance/WHA_Rules_of_Procedure-
en.pdf?ua=1.
39. The Member State representatives that attended the 68th WHA con-
sisted primarily of health ministries from around the world. 68th World
Health Assembly Opens in Geneva, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 18, 2015),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2015/wha-18-may-2015/en/.
The President of the 68th WHA, Jagat Prackash Nadda, is not a doctor, but a
lawyer, and serves as the Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare of
India. Jagat Prakash Nadda – Union Minister of Health and Family Welfare
of India, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 22, 2015),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/2015/wha68/president-jagat-prakash-
nadda/en/.
40. World Health Assembly, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/; see also WHO
CONST. art. 18 (describing the functions of the WHA); WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://apps.who.int/gb/gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
41. WHO Rules of Procedures, supra note 38, r. 2.
42. WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int/gb/gov/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
43. Id.
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port mechanisms to help facilitate effective international re-
sponses to infectious disease epidemics.44 The Global Outbreak
Alert & Response Network (GOARN) is a program within the
WHO that seeks to assist Member States in their responses to
international infectious disease epidemics (“IIDEs”) and to de-
velop “long-term epidemic preparedness and capacity build-
ing.”45 The Emerging Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Net-
work (EDPLN) is a network of laboratories that, through
knowledge and information sharing, seek to create “evidence-
based strategies, tools and practices for rapid detection and
containment of outbreaks of novel, emerging and dangerous
pathogens in order to minimize their impact on public health,
health systems and economies of affected areas.” 46 Another
GAR, the Department of Pandemic & Epidemic Diseases
(PED), consists of “disease-specific and public health experts
with field experience responding to outbreaks and emergencies
under the International Health Regulations framework.”47 The
PED works in conjunction with the EDPLN and other “expert
networks” to authenticate and refine emerging health tech-
niques, technologies, and strategies for implementation in
Member States that are faced with international public health
threats.48 Furthermore, the WHO is a member of the Travel
and Transport Task Force, established in August of 2014,
which specifically responded to the 2014 Ebola outbreak and
the negative impact that travel bans have had upon “the trade,
travel and tourism sector.”49
44. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 29–30.
45. Global Outbreak Alert and Response (GOARN), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/csr/outbreaknetwork/en/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
46. Emerging and Dangerous Pathogens Laboratory Network (EDPLN),
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2015),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/OP_EDPLN_FINAL.pdf.
47. Department of Pandemic & Epidemic Disease Flyer, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (2013), http://www.who.int/csr/disease/WHO_PED_flyer_2013.PDF
(“PED ensures that novel technologies, systems, and techniques are validated
and adapted for disease intervention and control in all settings (e.g. introduc-
tion of new rapid diagnostic tests.)”).
48. Id.
49. Statement from the Travel and Transport Task Force on Ebola Virus
Disease Outbreak in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Nov. 7, 2014),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-travel/en/.
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B. The IHR
In 1951, the WHO established the International Sanitary
Regulations, which were later renamed in 1969 the “Interna-
tional Health Regulations.”50 These regulations were estab-
lished to combat the most threatening epidemics of the time:
smallpox, typhus, relapsing fever, yellow fever, cholera, and
plague.51 The first edition of the IHR used a “disease-specific
approach,” making it applicable only to outbreaks of cholera,
plague, and yellow fever.52
The second edition of IHR entered into force in 2007,53 pri-
marily in response to the fact that new infectious diseases be-
gan to emerge that were not enumerated in the original Regu-
lation. Due to the exclusive “disease-specific approach” of the
original IHR, the original IHR became ineffective with respect
to these new infectious diseases.54 The current IHR is legally
binding on 194 countries55 (“Member States” or individually as
“Member State”) and aims “to prevent, protect against, control
and provide public health response to the international spread
of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted
to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interfer-
ence with international traffic and trade.”56 Additionally, the
IHR employs a collaborative approach57 in which the Member
50. Clift, supra note 27, at 24.
51. Clegg, supra note 28, at 443–44.
52. David P. Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global
Health Security: The New International Health Regulations, 4 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 325, 328, 339 (2005).
53. Id. at 327.
54. Id. at 338–39. The emergence of smallpox and HIV/AIDS in the years
that followed the implementation of the original IHR made the regulation
entirely useless in preventing the international spread of these infectious
diseases. Id. at 338. More recently, China’s failure to report the first case of
the SARS virus, which began the 2003 SARS epidemic, was said to be a defi-
ciency of the first edition of the IHR by its failure to require Member States
to notify the WHO of the emergence of infectious diseases. Id. at 325–26;
JULIE E. FISCHER ET. AL., STIMSON CTR. GLOB. HEALTH SECURITY PROGRAM,
GEO. WASH. U., THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (2005):
SURVEILLANCE AND RESPONSE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 8, 11, 29 (2011).
Some commentators claim this was the catalyst for the IHR revision process.
Fidler, supra note 52, at 325–26 & 343;
55. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, WORLD HEALTH
ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/about/10things/en/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
56. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 2.
57. See, e.g., id. art. 10.3.
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States and the WHO share information to facilitate a collective
and effective international strategy for combatting internation-
al health emergencies.58
C. IHR: The Balancing Act
Although the initial intent behind the IHR was to protect
against the impact that international health measures had
upon the international economy,59 the IHR also evidences the
WHO’s concern with the extent to which the IHR encroaches
upon domestic public health policy (or, in other words, state
sovereignty)60 and human rights.61 As such, the provisions of
the IHR perform a balancing act, taking into consideration
each of the following four values: (1) international public
health, (2) international human rights, (3) international trade
and traffic, and (4) state sovereignty (collectively referred to as
“the four values”).62
Although the IHR seeks to prevent both the hindrance of in-
ternational trade and traffic and the violation of individual
human rights by the health measures implemented by Member
States, the IHR does contain some provisions that encroach up-
on certain aspects of state sovereignty. Therefore, despite its
purpose and goals, the IHR contains some recommendations63
that provide for the violation of basic human rights, hindrance
of international trade, and encroachment upon state sovereign-
58. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, supra note 55.
59. See Foreword to, IHR (2005), supra note 19.
60. Timothy J. Miano, Understanding and Applying International Infec-
tious Disease Law: U.N. Regulations During an H5N1 Avian Flu Epidemic,
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L&COMP. L. 26, 36, 39 (2006).
61. Id. at 38; Fidler, supra note 52, at 45.
62. Fidler, supra note 52, at 45; see Miano, supra note 60, at 30; Foreword
to IHR (2005), supra note 19.
63. This is not to say that the WHO, which, through the IHR, is the only
authoritative body that recognizes that the violation or hindrance of certain
rights and values that we consider to be fundamental is justified when there
is a considerable threat to international public health. It is in fact a widely
held notion. The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures acknowledges that measures hindering international trade may be
justified if there is a scientific basis for their implementation. Additionally,
“international human rights law requires that measures infringing on civil
and political rights must be necessary to achieve a compelling public interest,
which—in the context of disease control—includes the mandate that the
measure have a basis in science and public health.” Fidler, supra note 52, at
382.
2016] Travel Restrictions and the IHR 791
ty, which are deemed necessary and justified to promote in-
ternational public health under certain dire circumstances.64
The IHR attempts, however, to limit these hindrances, viola-
tions, and encroachments by restricting the use of such
measures to particular instances in which certain criteria are
met,65 as opposed to allowing their implementation whenever
IIDEs66 are occurring.67
The IHR attempts to limit such encroachments by imposing
surveillance, notification, and verification requirements that
mandate Member States to notify the WHO when they believe
there is a risk to international health and provide scientific da-
ta to verify the perceived threat.68 In requiring Member States
to furnish such information, the WHO tasks the Director-
General,69 through its authority under the IHR, to provide
Member States with temporary recommendations70 and to de-
termine whether the use of standing recommendations is “nec-
essary and appropriate” given the specific health threat.71
Standing recommendations, which are recommendations ex-
pressly enumerated in the IHR, are meant for “routine and pe-
riodic application,” 72 while temporary recommendations are
64. Id.; Courtney Maccarone, Note, Crossing Borders: A TRIPS—Like
Treaty on Quarantine and Human Rights, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 781, 788
(2001).
65. Fidler, supra note 52, at 383.
66. In this Note, the term “IIDE” refers to international threats to human
health generally, not just ones that have been deemed to be Public Health
Emergency of International Concern (“PHEIC”).
67. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement, supra note 55; see, e.g., IHR
(2005), supra note 19, arts. 31, 32.
68. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 6.
69. The Director-General of the WHO is an elected member of the WHA
who performs key functions within the WHA, which consist of calling the
WHA to session, appointing his advisors (the “Emergency Committee”), de-
claring international health events as Public Health Emergencies of Interna-
tional Concern (“PHEICs”), promulgating and approving Temporary Recom-
mendations, and acting as a liaison with the U.N. WHO Rules of Procedure,
supra note 38, r. 1, 2, 8, 10; IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 48; WHO Const.
art. 31. (“The Director-General, subject to the authority of the Board, shall be
the chief technical and administrative officer of the Organization.”).
70. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 15(1).
71. Id. art. 53. The IHR defines “recommendation” to “refer to temporary
or standing recommendations issued under these Regulations.” Id. art 1.
72. Id. art. 16. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 53 (setting forth proce-
dures on implementing standing recommendations).
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considered “non-binding advice issued by [the] WHO . . . for
application on a time-limited, risk-specific basis, in response to
a public health emergency of international concern.”73
Once the WHO Director-General, with the assistance of the
IHR Emergency Committee,74 establishes that an IIDE consti-
tutes a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
(PHEIC),75 the Director-General may issue, with the assis-
tance of the Emergency Committee, temporary recommenda-
tions76 that provide insights and proposals to the Member
States regarding the current PHEIC. Ideally, temporarily
recommended responses to international public health emer-
gencies are proportionate to the magnitude of the perceived
threat and supported by scientific evidence, instead of an enu-
meration of the maximum extent to which Member States can
utilize certain health measures to prevent the spread of
IIDEs.77 These proportional responses seek to ensure that hu-
man rights violations and hindrances to international traffic
only occur when there is an actual and confirmed threat to in-
ternational health of sufficient consequence to warrant such
interference.78
73. Id.
74. The Emergency Committee is a group of expert advisors that the Di-
rector-General is obligated to appoint under Article 48 of the IHR (2005), su-
pra note 19. The expertise of the Emergency Committee is to be at the Direc-
tor-General’s disposal to “provide its views on: (a) whether an event consti-
tutes a public health emergency of international concern; (b) the termination
of a public health emergency of international concern; and (c) the proposed
issuance, modification, extension or termination of temporary recommenda-
tions.” IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 48.1.
75. IHR Procedures Concerning Public Health Emergencies of Internation-
al Concern (PHEIC), WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2016). An-
nex 2 of the IHR includes a “decision instrument” for determining whether
the threat constitutes a PHEIC. IHR (2005), supra note 19, at Annex 2. The
IHR defines a PHEIC as an “extraordinary event which is determined, as
provided in these Regulations: (i) to constitute a public health risk to other
States through the international spread of disease and (ii) to potentially re-
quire a coordinated international response.” IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 1.
76. IHR Procedures Concerning Public Health Emergencies of Internation-
al Concern (PHEIC), supra note 75; IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 48.1.
77. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, supra note 55.
78. See David P. Fidler & Lawrence O. Gostin, The New International
Health Regulations: An Historic Development for International Law and Pub-
lic Health, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 87 (2006).
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II. THE SCOPE AND EFFECT OF THE IHR
The IHR, like any other international regulation, faces chal-
lenges in regards to the ways in which the Regulation interacts
with Member States’ domestic policies.79 Furthermore, due to
the nature of the IHR as a regulation for the protection of pub-
lic health, the IHR must also tread lightly when it encounters
potential human rights infringements.80 It is a well-recognized
principle, however, that the limitation of certain fundamental
values, such as state sovereignty and human rights, are “nec-
essary” under certain circumstances.81 This concept is recog-
nized in the U.N. Siracusa Principles, which state,
[w]henever a limitation is required in terms of the Covenant
to be ‘necessary,’ this term implies that the limitation: (a) is
based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognized
by the relevant article of the Covenant, (b) responds to a
pressing public or social need, (c) pursues a legitimate aim,
and (d) is proportionate to that aim.82
Therefore, the WHO’s ability to take actions that may go be-
yond those that persons or states might deem reasonable is not
impermissible if the action purports to promote the interna-
tional public good.
A. The IHR and Human Rights
The IHR addresses human rights concerns through its gen-
eral purpose “to prevent, protect against, control, and provide
public health response to the international spread of disease in
ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public
health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international traffic and trade.”83 The IHR defines “interna-
tional traffic” as “the movement of persons, baggage, cargo,
containers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels across an in-
79. Miano, supra note 60, at 36–38.
80. See Foreword to IHR (2005), supra note 19.
81. See Miano, supra note 60, at 38; James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Efficacy in
Emergency Legal Preparedness Underlying the 2014 Ebola Outbreak, 2 TEX.
A&M L. REV. 353, 366–67 (2015).
82. Econ. and Social Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985).
83. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 2.
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ternational border, including international trade.”84 The U.N.
declares such movement as an inherent right of all persons in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,85 as it includes
“the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State,” and “the right to leave any country, in-
cluding his own, and to return to his country.”86 Therefore,
through the IHR’s purpose to avoid interference with interna-
tional traffic, and by extension the movement of persons, it ex-
plicitly recognizes the protection of some human rights as part
of the general purpose of the Regulation.
In the second edition of the IHR, the WHO added additional
human rights principles,87 thereby making them essential to
the accurate interpretation of the Regulation.88 Specifically, the
IHR makes clear that “[t]he implementation of these Regula-
tions shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights
and fundamental freedoms of persons,”89 and shall be applied
indiscriminately.90 The Regulation also provides for confidenti-
ality with regard to personal data collected by Member States,
and mandates that personal data should only be maintained
where it is “adequate, relevant and not excessive to [the] pur-
pose” of “assessing and managing public health risk[s].”91
The IHR further provides that both medical examination and
treatment92 shall not be imposed upon travelers without their
informed consent, whereby the person or guardian is made
aware of the risks associated with medical examination or
treatment and the potential dangers of refusing such medical
intervention. 93 Although provisions related to personal data
84. Id. art. 1.
85. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enumerates and affirms
“fundamental human rights to be universally protected.” The Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 30, 2016),
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/.
86. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 13
(Dec. 10, 1948).
87. Foreword to IHR (2005), supra 19.
88. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 78, at 87.
89. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 3.1.
90. Id. art. 42; see also id. art. 3.3.
91. Id. arts. 45.1, 45.2(b).
92. This Note, when using medical “treatment” in this context, is referenc-
ing the use of “vaccination and other prophylaxis” as available health
measures set forth in the IHR. See, e.g., id. arts. 23.4, 31.2(b).
93. Id. arts. 23.3, 23.4.
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and medical exams seem to implement human rights principals
by requiring informed consent, there are also provisions of the
IHR indicating that “compulsory health measures”94 may be
justified when concerns for public health rise to a level where
intervention is necessary.95 Although the IHR permits the im-
plementation of compulsory health measures when Member
States are faced with “imminent public health risk[s],” the
Regulation attempts to limit human rights violations by provid-
ing for the use of “the least invasive and intrusive medical ex-
amination[s]” and for the humane and proper treatment of
travelers.96
Despite the apparent emphasis that the IHR seems to place
upon the preservation of human rights, there are some holes in
94. For purposes of this Note, “compulsory health measures” refers to
health measures that permit Member States to require or compel an individ-
ual to undergo medical examination, medical treatment, or any other health
measure that would cause or prevent an individual from taking certain ac-
tion. Such measures are deemed permissible under Article 31.2 of the IHR
which states that:
[i]f there is evidence of an imminent public health risk, the State
Party may, in accordance with its national law and to the extent
necessary to control such risk, compel the traveller to undergo: (a)
the least invasive and intrusive medical examination that would
achieve the public health objective; (b) vaccination or other prophy-
laxis; or (c) additional established health measures that prevent or
control the spread of disease including isolation, quarantine, or plac-
ing the traveller under public health observation.
Id. art. 31.2.
95. See id.
96. Id. art. 32. When effecting health measures pursuant to these regula-
tions, States Parties have an obligation under the IHR to
treat travellers with respect for their dignity, human rights and fun-
damental freedoms and minimize any discomfort or distress associ-
ated with such measures, including by: (a) treating all travellers
with courtesy and respect; (b) taking into consideration the gender,
sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns of travellers; and (c)
providing or arranging for adequate food and water, appropriate ac-
commodation and clothing, protection for baggage and other posses-
sions, appropriate medical treatment, means of necessary communi-
cation if possible in a language that they can understand and other
appropriate assistance for travellers who are quarantined, isolated
or subject to medical examinations or other procedures for public
health purposes.
Id.
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the Regulation that create significant potential for human
rights violations under circumstances when compulsory health
measures are considered justified.97 This risk only increases
when ambiguous phrases such as “imminent public health
risk,” “to the extent necessary to control such risk,” and “the
least invasive and intrusive,” are the only mechanisms through
which the use of compulsory health measures is limited. It is
here where the IHR’s attempt to adhere to each of the four val-
ues results in the protection of some values at the expense of
others.98
B. The IHR & State Sovereignty
The IHR also incorporates articles that acknowledge states’
sovereignty.99 Despite the IHR’s international reach and force
in imposing duties and obligations upon Member States,100
the IHR also grants some leeway in the implementation of
certain provisions of the IHR.101
1. Member States’ Discretionary Power under the IHR
The discretionary power granted by the IHR to the Member
States arose in response to the Member States’ concerns that
the IHR’s limitations on the use of public health measures
would encumber their ability to prevent the spread of IIDEs
within their respective countries.102 Additional concerns origi-
nated from the WHO’s reluctance to institute regulations that
would make it increasingly difficult for Member States to make
public health decisions when faced with substantial public
health risks.103 Moreover, the WHO was aware of the fact that
countries were unlikely to sign onto the IHR,104 and that Mem-
ber States were unlikely to comply with the IHR, if their sover-
eign authority was heavily compromised as a result. 105 As
97. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 78, at 87–88.
98. SeeMiano, supra note 60, at 40.
99. Id. at 36.
100. See, e.g., IHR (2005), supra note 19, arts. 6, 10, 32.
101. Miano, supra note 60, at 38; see also, e.g., IHR (2005), supra note 19,
arts. 23.2, 43.1.
102. Fidler, supra note 52, at 379.
103. Miano, supra note 60, at 41.
104. Id.
105. David P. Fidler, Return of the Fourth Horseman: Emerging Infectious
Diseases and International Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 771, 848 (1997).
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such, both Member States and the WHO, through their mu-
tual goal to create a useful and effective legal framework for a
global response to international health threats, also have a
common interest in defining clear and unambiguous bounda-
ries signifying where the WHO’s authority under the IHR ends
and state sovereignty begins.106 This delineation of authority is
mutually desirable by both the WHO and Member States as it
fosters “a balance between the need for [the] WHO to exercise
its authority and the legitimate concerns Member States had
about the revised IHR impinging on their sovereignty.”107 How-
ever, any unified framework that requires cooperation and col-
laboration between different governing bodies proves difficult
where uniform and transparent administration might favor a
singular authoritative body, but instead requires the balancing
of authority between the regulating body itself and the States
it was formed to regulate.108
To account for this tension, the IHR contains multiple provi-
sions that contemplate the sovereignty of the Member States.109
The most significant recognition of state sovereignty in the IHR
is illustrated by the Regulations’ allowance of Member
States to use both compulsory health measures110 and “addi-
tional health measures,” and the accompanying ambiguity re-
garding these provisions’ limitations. 111 As previously men-
tioned, compulsory health measures are only minimally re-
stricted by the IHR,112 and “additional health measures” under
the IHR are regulated only to the extent that they “shall not be
106. See Fidler, supra note 52, at 381.
107. Id.
108. SeeMiano, supra note 60, at 36, 39.
109. See, e.g., IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 3.4. (“States have, in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of interna-
tional law, the sovereign right to legislate and to implement legislation in
pursuance of their health policies. In doing so they should uphold the purpose
of these Regulations.”).
110. See Fidler, supra note 52, at 369.
111. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, arts. 31.2, 43.1. Because the Regulation
uses nondefinitive language to describe limitations on the use of additional or
compulsory health measures, ambiguity exists about how exactly those
measures are limited. Member States can use compulsory health measures
“to the extent necessary to control such risk,” id. art. 31.2, and additional
health measures “shall not be more restrictive of international traffic and not
more invasive or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives
that would achieve the appropriate level of health protection,” id. art. 43.1.
112. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 78, at 87–88.
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more restrictive of international traffic and not more invasive
or intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives
that would achieve the appropriate level of health protec-
tion.”113 The lack of clarity in the Regulation, with regards to
the extent to which compulsory and additional health measures
may be utilized, creates an inference of deference to the Mem-
ber States and effectively grants the Member States the discre-
tion to implement health measures without the WHO’s sub-
stantial interference.114 As such, it becomes clear that the
WHO balances its authority with the sovereignty of the Mem-
ber States by granting them substantial leeway in the imple-
menation of such health measures, provided that the Member
States’ utilization of such health measures is in accordance
with the IHR’s purpose.115
C. Obligations Imposed by the IHR upon Member States
Some articles of the IHR, however, do impose certain duties
on the Member States that encroach upon their state sover-
eignty.116 The IHR mandates that the Member States create
and maintain sufficient infrastructure to ensure their capabil-
ity of complying with the Regulations’ surveillance require-
113. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 43.1.
114. See Statement on the 5th Meeting of the International Health Regula-
tions Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Afri-
ca, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 10, 2015) [hereinafter 5th Meeting of the IHR
Regarding the Ebola Outbreak],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ec-ebola/en/ (“The
Committee discussed the issue of inappropriate health measures that go be-
yond those in the temporary recommendations issued to date. The Committee
was very concerned that additional health measures, such as quarantine of
returning travellers, refusal of entry, cancellation of flights and border clo-
sures significantly interfere with international travel and transport and neg-
atively impact both the response and recovery efforts. Although some coun-
tries are reported to have recently rescinded these additional health
measures, and some regional airlines have resumed flights to affected coun-
tries, about 40 countries are still implementing additional measures and a
number of airlines have not resumed flights to these countries.”).
115. Fidler, supra note 52, at, 382; see also World Health Org., Revision of
the International Health Regulation, WHA58.3 (2005),
http://www.who.int/ipcs/publications/wha/ihr_resolution.pdf.
116. Arielle Silver, Obstacles to Complying with the World Health Organiza-
tion’s 2005 International Health Regulations, 26 WIS. INT’L L. J. 229, 237
(2008).
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ments in Article 5.117 Member States must, within five years of
joining the IHR, establish “the capacity to detect, assess, notify
and report events in accordance with these Regulations.”118
Member States are also subject to notification requirements,
which mandate Member States to “communicate to the WHO
timely, accurate and sufficiently detailed public health infor-
mation” regarding the health threat.119
The WHO also reserves the right to request verification in-
formation from a Member State regarding the perceived
PHEIC, which must be acknowledged and complied with with-
in twenty-four hours of the WHO’s request.120 Furthermore, the
IHR maintains the WHO’s ability to acquire information re-
garding the spread of IIDEs in Member States through sources
other than the Member States themselves.121 As a result, the
WHO maintains its ability to take action without receiving offi-
cial verification that the current threat to international health
constitutes a PHEIC from the Member State itself.122
D. The WHO’s Enforcement Power of the IHR
The implementation of these positive duties into the IHR up-
on its revision in 2005 has made complying with the Regulation
even more onerous for the Member States than before, and has
thus been said to “privilege global health governance over
state sovereignty.”123 However, although the WHO proclaims
the IHR to be legally binding on the Member States,124 the
term “binding” is not applied in the traditional legal sense.
This is for two identifiable reasons. First, the WHO Constitu-
tion fails to grant the WHO either the authority to impose
sanctions for noncompliance or to compel compliance with
its binding recommendations and regulations.125 Second, the
117. IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 5.1.
118. Id. art. 5.1.
119. Id. art. 6.2.
120. Id. art. 10.2.
121. Id. art. 9.1.
122. Silver, supra note 116, at 238.
123. Fidler & Gostin, supra note 78, at 87, 90.
124. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, supra note 55.
125. Fidler, supra note 105, at 848; Silver, supra note 116, at 244. Article 7
of the WHO Constitution provides for the suspension of voting privileges
when Member States fail to meet financial obligations to the WHO, but this
issue is beyond the scope of this Note. This Note focuses on the nonexistence
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WHO’s deference to the principle of state sovereignty under the
IHR has weakened the effectiveness of the Regulation126 due to
the WHO’s nonenforcement of the IHR and use of nonbinding
recommendations in the IHR.127 Consequentially, this has re-
sulted in noncompliance by the Member States with the IHR.128
However, the lack of the WHO’s legal enforcement of the IHR
is considered to be inevitable, beneficial, and nondetrimental to
the IHR in terms of its administration and effect. The lack of
legal enforcement is first inevitable, because the ability of in-
ternational institutions to apply any legal pressure or to im-
pose any legal sanctions upon members of the international
community is notoriously weak.129 On the other hand, the lack
of enforcement is also beneficial, because it allows the IHR to
be dynamic by allowing the WHO to update its recommenda-
tions in accordance with the relevant PHEIC, new scientific
discoveries, and new strategies for promoting international
health.130 Lastly, the lack of enforcement of the IHR by the
WHO is ultimately nondetrimental to the IHR’s initiative to
regulate international response to IIDEs, for several reasons.
First, even though the provisions of the IHR do not explicitly
bind Member States to take certain action, they ultimately en-
courage Member States to comply with the Regulation.131 For
example, before the IHR permitted the WHO to collect infor-
mation regarding IIDEs from sources other than the Member
States themselves, Member States affected by an IIDE would
of sanctions for noncompliance with nonfinancial obligations in the IHR.
WHO Const. art. 7.
126. Silver, supra note 116, at 244.
127. Fidler, supra note 105, at 848.
128. Silver, supra note 116, at 234.
129. Mark J. Volansky, Achieving Global Health: A Review of the World
Health Organization’s Response, 10 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 233, 251 (2002).
One scholar stated,
When skeptics claim that international legal institutions have little
power, what they typically point to is inability to directly enforce in-
ternational decisions. If a country were to ignore a World Court deci-
sion, for example, there would be no international analog to seizure
or attachment . . . . Thus, it is possible to argue that international
law has little weight because it is not backed by force.
Lea Brilmayer, International Justice and International Law, 98 W. VA. L.
REV. 611, 624 (1996).
130. Volansky, supra note 129, at 249.
131. See Fidler & Gostin, supra note 78, at 90.
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often violate notification and verification requirements for fear
that it would result in other Member States implementing
health measures restrictive to international trade, which would
be economically damaging to them.132 As such, the ability of the
WHO to seek information about IIDEs from nongovernmental
sources133 functions to incentivize Member States to comply
with notification and verification requirements, since the WHO
has GARs with the resources and capabilities to monitor IIDEs
closely.134
Another avenue through which the WHO is able to encourage
compliance with the IHR, without direct enforcement, is
through its image of “organizational legitimacy.”135 Member
States are more likely to comply with the IHR because their
goals and values are consistent with those embodied in the
Regulation,136 and due to the diplomacy fostered between WHO
officials and government officials in the Member States.137 Fur-
thermore, the WHO as an international institution is unaffect-
ed by political influence and is thus presumably impartial in
issuing its recommendations.138 As such, the Member States
possess a degree of confidence in the WHO and its ability to
promote international health in a manner that effectively ad-
dresses all of its economic and human rights concerns,139 allow-
ing the IHR to not be undermined by its lack of legal enforce-
ment.
III. TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AS AMEASURE TO PREVENT THE
SPREAD OF IIDES
The following Part will analyze the IHR and its various
commingled provisions to examine whether the use of travel
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Silver, supra note 116, at 245–46.
135. See Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A
Legal Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.
L. & MED. 301, 320–21 (1992) (“WHO also exerts leverage on some member
nations’ policies through its organizational legitimacy. According to Ernst B.
Haas, ‘[o]rganizational legitimacy exists when the membership values the
organization and generally implement[s] collective decisions because they are
seen to serve the members’ values.’”).
136. Volansky, supra note 126, at 249.
137. Taylor, supra note 135, at 322.
138. See Silver, supra note 116, at 245.
139. See id.
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restrictions during IIDEs is permissible under the IHR and to
what extent. The Part will then go on to provide an extensive
analysis of the 2014 Ebola outbreak, the role that travel re-
strictions played during this particular health emergency, and
how the IHR and the WHO functioned to prevent Member
States from implementing such measures.
A. Travel Restrictions and the IHR
Travel restrictions are health measures implemented by
countries to prevent infected persons from travelling to and
from infected regions and thereby fostering the spread of
IIDEs.140 In order to determine whether the use of travel re-
strictions is provided for and subject to limitation under the
IHR, it is necessary to determine whether travel restrictions,
such as flight suspension and border closure, fall into any of
the categories of health measures enumerated in the Regula-
tion.
The WHO Constitution grants the WHA the broad discretion
and authority to implement regulations regarding, among oth-
er things, “sanitary and quarantine requirements and other
procedures designed to prevent the international spread of dis-
ease.”141 As such, the IHR explicitly enumerates thirteen dif-
ferent health measures that the WHO may recommend with
regards to persons during international health emergencies,
which include:
[N]o specific health measures [being] advised; review[ing]
travel history in affected areas; review[ing] proof of medical
examination and any laboratory analysis; requir[ing] medical
examinations; review[ing] proof of vaccination or other
prophylaxis; requir[ing] vaccination or other prophylaxis;
plac[ing] suspect persons under public health observation;
implement[ing] quarantine or other health measures for sus-
pect persons; implement[ing] isolation and treatment where
necessary of affected persons; implement[ing] tracing of con-
tacts of suspect or affected persons; refus[ing] entry of suspect
and affected persons; refus[ing] entry of unaffected persons to
140. Y.L. Huizer et al., Usefulness and Applicability of Infectious Disease
Control Measures in Air Travel: A Review, 13 TRAVEL MED. & INFECTIOUS
DISEASE 19, 26 (2015).
141. WHO Const. art. 21. The WHO Constitution pertains to the WHO and
the WHA with regard to all of the regulations they establish and therefore
does not only apply to the IHR.
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affected areas; and implement[ing] exit screening and/or re-
strictions on persons from affected areas.142
Although the IHR does not mention explicitly flight suspension
or border closure as travel restrictions that can be recommend-
ed by the WHO, the IHR does provide for the “refus[al] [of] en-
try of suspect143 and affected144 persons” into a country, and the
“implement[ation] [of] exit screening and/or restrictions on per-
sons from affected areas”145 as permitted health measures.
These provisions appear to evidence the fact that the use of
travel restriction aligns with the categories of health measures
that the IHR contemplates as permissible and potentially use-
ful tools in combatting the international spread of an IIDE.
WHO temporary recommendations from the last four major
Public Health Emergencies of International Concern, however,
have advised against the use of travel restrictions to prevent
the spread of each epidemic and have instead recommended
measures such as the use of exit screening, information shar-
ing, capacity building, and “isolation of suspect and probable
cases.”146
142. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 18.1.
143. The IHR defines “suspect” as “those persons, baggage, cargo, contain-
ers, conveyances, goods or postal parcels considered by a State Party as hav-
ing been exposed, or possibly exposed, to a public health risk and that could
be a possible source of spread of disease.” IHR (2005), supra note 19, at art. 1.
144. The IHR defines “affected” as “persons, baggage, cargo, containers,
conveyances, goods, postal parcels or human remains that are infected or
contaminated, or carry sources of infection or contamination, so as to consti-
tute a public health risk.” IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 1.
145. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 18.1.
146. The Director-General advised against the use of travel restrictions dur-
ing the 2003 SARS outbreak, the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, the 2014 Ebola out-
break, and the 2015 MERS-CoV outbreak. WHO Statement on the Tenth
Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding MERS, WORLDHEALTH
ORG. (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-emergency-
committee-mers/en/; Third Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/3rd_meeting_ihr/en/#
(last visited Feb. 27, 2016); Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the International
Health Regulations Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Out-
break in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 22, 2014) [hereinafter
Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-2nd-ihr-
meeting/en/; Summary of WHO Measures Related to International Travel,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jun. 24, 2003),
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Nevertheless, Member States continued to implement travel
restrictions147 and did so legally, since temporary recommenda-
tions are nonbinding advice,148 and pursuant to the binding
IHR,149 Member States are permitted to implement “additional
health measures,” which are those that “(a) achieve the same or
greater level of health protection than WHO recommendations;
or (b) are otherwise prohibited under” other articles of the Reg-
http://www.who.int/csr/sars/travelupdate/en/; 5th Meeting of the IHR Regard-
ing the Ebola Outbreak, supra note 114.
147. See, e.g., Statement on the 6th Meeting of the International Health Reg-
ulations Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West
Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 7, 2015) [hereinafter Statement on the 6th
Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ebola-7-july-
2015/en/ (“The Committee noted that although some improvements have been
observed, inappropriate travel and transport measures continue to be imple-
mented by numerous countries and a number of international airlines have
still not resumed flights to the affected countries.”); Statement on the 7th
Meeting of the International Health Regulations Emergency Committee Re-
garding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WORLDHEALTH ORG. (Oct. 5,
2015) [hereinafter Statement on the 7th Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding
Ebola], http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2015/ihr-ebola-7th-
meeting/en/ (“The Committee was concerned that although some improve-
ments have been observed in the rescinding of excessive or inappropriate
travel and transport measures, 34 countries continue to enact measures that
are disproportionate to the risks posed, and which negatively impact re-
sponse and recovery efforts. Furthermore, a number of international airlines
have yet to resume flights to the affected countries.”); Lawrence O. Gostin,
Influenza A(H1N1) and Pandemic Preparedness Under the Rule of Interna-
tional Law, 301 JAMA 2376, 2378 (2009) (“WHO suggested travel restrictions
would have ‘very little effect on stopping the virus from spreading, but would
be highly disruptive to the travel community.’ Despite this, many countries,
including the United States, have advised against all nonessential travel to
Mexico. Some countries have implemented outright travel bans. For example,
China suspended all flights between the 2 countries and chartered a plane to
pick up Chinese nationals within Mexico. Additionally, Latin American coun-
tries (Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, and Cuba) suspended flights from Mexico.”);
S. Korean Airlines to Resume Suspended Flights as MERS Wanes, REUTERS,
Jul. 21, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/21/southkorea-airlines-
mers-idUSL3N1012YQ20150721; China Facing Big SARS Spread-WHO,
CNN.COM, Apr. 22, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/04/21/sars.wrap/ (“Singapore
Airlines’ regional Asian carrier SilkAir announced it will suspend some
flights to Indonesia, China and Thailand in May because of the impact of
SARS.”).
148. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 1.
149. Ten Things You Need to Do to Implement the IHR, supra note 55.
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ulation.150 Not to mention, the IHR further permits Member
States to utilize additional health measures that rise to the
level of “significantly interfer[ing] with international traffic,”151
provided that the Member States furnish the WHO with “the
public health rationale and relevant scientific information for
it”152 within forty-eight hours of their implementation.153 Once
a Member State implements those additional health measures
that “significantly interfere with international traffic,” the only
course of action that the WHO purports to take against them,
is to “request that the [Member] State [] concerned reconsider
the application of the measure.”154 As a result, although the
WHO has continuously advised against the use of travel re-
strictions as a method of thwarting the spread of IIDEs, Mem-
ber States have and can maneuver around these advisements
through the provisions of the IHR.
B. The 2014 Ebola Outbreak and Travel Restrictions
The 2014 Ebola outbreak was among the most significant in-
ternational events of 2014, and has been declared the largest
Ebola outbreak to date,155 resulting in 28,457 cases and 11,312
deaths worldwide.156 The 2014 Ebola outbreak began in Guinea
in December of 2013157 and continued to spread to Liberia, Si-
erra Leone, Italy, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States—with Guinea, Liberia, and
150. See IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 43.1.
151. Article 43.3 of the IHR defines “significant interference” as the “refusal
of entry or departure of international travelers, baggage, cargo, containers,
conveyances, goods, and the like, or their delay, for more than 24 hours.” IHR
(2005), supra note 19, art. 43.3.
152. See id.
153. Id. art. 43.5.
154. Id. art. 43.4.
155. Statement on the 1st Meeting of the International Health Regulations
Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,
WORLDHEALTHORG. (Aug. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Statement on the 1st Meeting
of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola],
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
The first Ebola outbreak occurred in 1976 in Zaire, Africa and claimed 280
lives. Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 7. This was the
largest Ebola outbreak in history until the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Id.
156. Ebola Situation Report, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 7, 2015),
http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-7-october-
2015.
157. Origins of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic, supra note 1.
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Sierra Leone experiencing the greatest incidence of the dis-
ease.158 The 2014 outbreak was declared a PHEIC by the WHO
Director-General on August 8, 2014.159
The Emergency Committee first met on August 8, 2014, and
proposed recommendations to combat the international spread
of Ebola, which the Director-General endorsed and determined
to be temporary recommendations under the IHR.160 Included
in these temporary recommendations was a specific advisement
against the use of travel restrictions.161 The second and third
meetings of the Emergency Committee held on September 22,
2014, and October 23, 2014, respectively, reiterated the im-
portance of not instituting restrictions on international travel.
During the September meeting, it was stated that: “Flight can-
cellations and other travel restrictions continue to isolate af-
fected countries resulting in detrimental economic consequenc-
es, and hinder relief and response efforts risking further inter-
national spread of the disease.”162 During the October meeting
it was repeated that:
A general travel ban is likely to cause economic hardship, and
could consequently increase the uncontrolled migration of
people from affected countries, raising the risk of internation-
al spread of Ebola. The Committee emphasized the im-
portance of normalizing air travel . . . to and from the affected
areas, to reduce the isolation and economic hardship of the af-
fected countries.163
Additionally, a statement by the Travel and Trade Task Force,
which was involved with this particular emergency, supported
this advisement against travel bans, due to the fact that the
manner in which Ebola is communicated provides for a low risk
of transmission during travel.164 However, the inappropriate
158. Ebola Situation Report, supra note 156.
159. Ebola Virus Disease, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ (last updated Jan.
2016).
160. Statement on the 1st IHR EC Meeting Regarding Ebola, supra note
155.
161. Id.
162. Statement on the 2nd IHR EC Meeting Regarding Ebola, supra note
146.
163. Statement on the 3rd IHR EC Meeting Regarding Ebola, supra note 24.
164. Statement from the Travel and Transport Task Force on Ebola Virus
Disease Outbreak in West Africa, supra note 49.
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use of travel restrictions continued to take place through Octo-
ber 5, 2015,165 and was noted during the seventh meeting of the
IHR Emergency Committee, which stated that travel measures
were still being utilized in thirty-four countries.166
Despite temporary recommendations encouraging the contra-
ry, the 2014 Ebola outbreak provoked various countries and
airlines to restrict travel into their territories through flight
suspension, border closure, visa suspension, entry screening,
and travel bans.167 As of August 31, 2014, Ghana, Chad, Cote
D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gambia, Kenya, Guinea Bissau, and Togo
implemented flight bans.168 Among these eight countries, all
are signatories to the IHR.169 As such, these Member States
violated the temporary recommendations issued during all sev-
en Emergency Committee meetings regarding the 2014 Ebola
outbreak.170
165. Statement on the 7th Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola, supra
note 147.
166. Id.
167. Gomes et. al., supra note 10.
168. Id. As of August 31, 2014, the countries that had prohibited the entry
of its citizens or visitors from Ebola-infected regions included Zambia, Mauri-
tania, Botswana, and South Africa. Countries that had instituted border clo-
sure measures included Cape Verde Islands, Cameroon, Senegal, Rwanda,
Gabon, and Namibia. Id. See generally Nick Thompson & Inez Torre, Ebola
Virus: Countries with Travel Restrictions in Place, CNN.COM (Nov. 4, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/04/world/ebola-virus-restrictions-map/ (listing
and mapping the countries that instituted any type travel restriction during
the 2014 Ebola outbreak).
169. See States Parties to the International Health Regulations, WORLD
HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/legal_issues/states_parties/en/ (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016).
170. See Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola, su-
pra note 155; Statement on the 2nd Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola,
supra note 146; Statement on the 3rd Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebo-
la, supra note 24; Statement on the 4th Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding
Ebola, supra note 22. The WHO reported:
The Committee was very concerned that additional health measures,
such as quarantine of returning travellers, refusal of entry, cancella-
tion of flights and border closures significantly interfere with inter-
national travel and transport and negatively impact both the re-
sponse and recovery efforts. Although some countries are reported to
have recently rescinded these additional health measures, and some
regional airlines have resumed flights to affected countries, about 40
countries are still implementing additional measures and a number
of airlines have not resumed flights to these countries.
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The failure of the IHR to limit the extent to which Member
States utilized travel restrictions during the 2014 Ebola out-
break is highlighted in a WHO Review Committee report re-
garding the role that the IHR played in the outbreak’s re-
sponse.171 Among the three primary weaknesses that the WHO
Review Committee discussed, was the IHR’s inability to pre-
vent “States Parties’ imposition of measures, such as re-
strictions on travel and trade, that go beyond temporary rec-
ommendations issued by the IHR Emergency Committee.”172
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE IHR THROUGH SUNSETTING PHASE-OUT PROVISIONS
The IHR is criticized for its vagueness 173 and permissive-
ness174 in defining and enforcing if, when, and how Member
States should implement certain health measures. 175 These
criticisms are in response to the WHO’s attempts to provide
Members States with recommended responses to interna-
tional public health emergencies176 that are proportionate to
the magnitude of the perceived threat rather than restricting
the extent to which Member States may utilize certain health
measures.177 Although this is a clear flaw in the execution of
the IHR, which has led to notable noncompliance with the Reg-
ulation, it is also the means by which the IHR defers to the
Member States on the grounds of state sovereignty.178 Howev-
er, due to the effects that certain health measures (such as the
5th Meeting of the IHR Regarding the Ebola Outbreak, supra note 114; see
also Statement on the 6th Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola, supra note
144; Statement on the 7th Meeting of the IHR EC Regarding Ebola, supra
note 147.
171. See Report of the First Meeting of the Review Committee on the Role of
the International Health Regulations (2005) in the Ebola Outbreak and Re-
sponse, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.who.int/ihr/review-
committee-2016/IHRReviewCommittee_FirstMeetingReport.pdf.
172. Id.
173. Maccarone, supra note 64, at 800.
174. Andreas Schloenhardt, Keeping the Ill Out: Immigration Issues in Asia
Concerning the Exclusion of Infectious Diseases, 35 HONG KONG L.J. 445, 469
(2005).
175. See Maccarone, supra note 64, at 800; Schloenhardt, supra note 174, at
469.
176. IHR (2005), supra note 19, arts. 15–18.
177. Ten Things You Need to do to Implement the IHR, supra note 55.
178. SeeMiano, supra note 60, at 40.
2016] Travel Restrictions and the IHR 809
restriction of international traffic) can have upon the interests
of international health, human rights, state sovereignty, and
the international economy, the vagueness of the IHR presents a
problem that must be addressed in order to refine both the
Regulation and Member States’ responses to international
health emergencies. Thus, when addressing the vagueness is-
sue, the IHR must properly balance these interests, assigning
them the appropriate weights.
Scientific studies based upon data collected from prior IIDEs
have come to conflicting conclusions about the effectiveness of
travel restrictions during international health emergencies.
What is ultimately evident from these studies is that health
measures restrictive of travel can either be effective,179 det-
rimental,180 or inconsequential181 to the effort to prevent the
spread of IIDEs, depending upon several factors that include
the nature of the relevant IIDE, the preparedness of region in
which it emerges,182 the political and socioeconomic climate of
the infected region,183 the rate of spread of the epidemic,184 and
the extent to which the IIDE has already spread.185 Studies
have found that even though travel restrictions can delay the
spread of an IIDE, this delay is often negligible—spanning
from a couple of days to a couple of weeks depending on the ex-
tent to which travel is actually restricted.186 Additionally, trav-
el restrictions are often counterproductive in that such delay in
travel only disrupts international response by making it more
difficult for the expedient transportation of response teams and
resources to infected regions.187 However, other studies have
179. See Hollingsworth et al., supra note 10, at 498.
180. See Gomes et. al., supra note 10.
181. See Bajardi et al., supra note 15.
182. See Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 497–98.
183. Tiffany Bogich et al., Preventing Pandemics Via International Devel-
opment: A Systems Approach, PLOSMED., Dec. 2012, at 1; Mark J. Siedner et
al., Strengthening the Detection of and Early Response to Public Health
Emergencies: Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic, PLOS MED.,
Mar. 24, 2015, at 2.
184. Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 498.
185. Ana LP Mateus et al., Effectiveness of Travel Restrictions in the Rapid
Containment of the Human Influenza: A Systematic Review, 92 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 868 (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/92/12/14-135590.pdf.
186. See Bajardi et. al., supra note 15.
187. See Gomes et. al., supra note 10.
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found that travel restrictions implemented in an affected coun-
try can be beneficial if implemented when the epidemic is con-
tained in the affected country before the number of cases
reaches a certain threshold amount.188 Despite the clear posi-
tive, negative, or nonexistent effects that travel restrictions
have upon the spread of IIDEs—depending upon the circum-
stances surrounding the outbreak, and the residual effects that
they have upon human rights, the international economy,189
and the autonomy of Member States190—they are very mini-
mally regulated in the IHR.
To the extent that the IHR does regulate travel restrictions,
the lack of specificity in the Regulation weakens compliance
with and the effectiveness of the IHR during international
health emergencies.191 As such, the IHR is not the WHO’s most
effective mechanism for coordinating and regulating interna-
tional response to IIDEs due to the IHR’s ambiguity and the
WHO’s lack of enforcement power.192 One of the assets that the
WHO possesses in regards to promoting compliance with the
IHR, however, is its reputation as a prestigious and legitimate
organization that Member States have come to trust.193 Addi-
tionally, the various resources that the WHO has at its dispos-
al, including GOARN and EDPLN, presumably instill the
Member States with additional confidence in the WHO, be-
cause of its ability to find the most effective strategies for com-
batting IIDEs.194
A. The Proposal: Sunsetting Phase-Out Provisions to Refine the
IHR
Rather than legislating in a manner that idealizes the inter-
national response to IIDEs, the IHR should instead implement
a framework of sunsetting phase-out provisions that instruct
Member States on when and to what extent to implement cer-
188. See Hollingsworth et. al., supra note 10, at 498. This study found that
“containment [(through travel restrictions)] of a pandemic influenza strain is
probably only feasible when there are less than 50 cases.” Id.
189. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 7.
190. SeeMiano, supra note 60, at 40.
191. SeeMaccarone, supra note 64, at 800.
192. See Schloenhardt, supra note 174, at 469; Maccarone, supra note 64, at
800.
193. Taylor, supra note 135, at 320–21.
194. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 17, at 30.
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tain travel restrictions.195 The use of sunsetting phase-out pro-
visions would allow the WHO to more closely and precisely
regulate Member States’ responses to IIDEs by providing a
workable framework from which the Member States can de-
duce the appropriate responses to IIDEs, based upon the actual
nature of the outbreak. In other words, by having a regulation
that contains scientifically grounded provisions that are proven
to be effective in eradicating outbreaks of diseases with similar
transmission profiles, Member States will be better equipped to
respond effectively to the current outbreak. This method of
regulation would preserve the flexibility of the IHR, while also
increasing its effectiveness and the Member States’ degree of
compliance with the Regulation, without the burden of imple-
menting an unrealistic enforcement regime. Although Member
States might not specifically comply with every provision of
this revised IHR, its empirical basis would presumably in-
crease the chances that Member States’ responses would be
within a range of reasonableness and effectiveness, given what
would be most fitting and appropriate for the specific outbreak.
Furthermore it would keep interferences with human rights,
state sovereignty, and the international economy to a mini-
mum.
1. Phase-Out Provisions
Phase-out provisions are often utilized in American tax legis-
lation.196 They serve various purposes within the U.S. Tax Code
(the “Tax Code”), including incentivizing certain taxpayer be-
haviors and promoting horizontal equity.197 This essentially
allows tax legislators to refine the Tax Code so that it has the
exact effect that is intended.198 Phase-out provisions come in
various forms; however, for the purposes of this Note, they are
provisions that are limited in their application based upon
195. This recommended solution can also be easily applied to other health
measures besides those restrictive upon travel. However, for the purposes of
this Note, this solution will only be examined in regards to travel restrictions
as a measure to prevent the international spread of infectious disease epi-
demics.
196. Hartman, supra note 26, at 188.
197. Horizontal equity requires “that similarly situated individuals face
similar tax burdens.” David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as A Principle of Tax
Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’YREV. 43, 43 (2006).
198. Hartman, supra note 26, at 188–89.
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some sort of referent provided for in the provision.199 For in-
stance, a phase-out provision in a tax code may make it so that
a benefit such as a tax credit increases or decreases (“phases
in” or “phases out”) at a rate that is dependent upon how much
income or other benefits the taxpayer receives (the referent).200
A more concrete example of this is found in §195(b)(1) of the
Tax Code, which provides a tax benefit to taxpayers starting
new businesses in the form of a deduction.201 This deduction
enables new business owners to offset a certain amount of the
costs they incur in entering into a new trade or business, by
reducing their taxable income by that amount. Under this pro-
vision, such taxpayers are permitted to deduct up to $5000 of
their start-up expenses “for the taxable year in which the ac-
tive trade or business begins.”202 Once their start-up expenses
begin to exceed $50,000, however, the amount of the allowable
deduction begins to decrease by the amount by which the tax-
payer’s start-up expenses exceed $50,000.203 This feature is re-
ferred to as a “phase-out”; decreasing the amount of a tax bene-
fit depending upon the extent to which a taxpayers’ start-up
expenses exceed a certain threshold amount.204
In the United States, “Congress believes that phase-outs as-
sist with ‘the goal of personalizing the [f]ederal income tax
based on each individual’s ability to pay taxes.’”205 Similarly,
regulations governing international health response must be
personalized to the current IIDE and the context within which
it arises.206 As previously mentioned, during the 2014 Ebola
outbreak, the Travel and Trade Task Force held the view that
one of the reasons why travel bans were not an effective means
of limiting the spread of the Ebola virus was because the virus
had a low risk of transmission during travel—since the means
of transmission was only transferred through direct exposure
to bodily fluids of an infected person who had the virus and was
199. Id. at 189.
200. Id.
201. A deduction is a mechanism that allows a taxpayer to reduce or offset
their taxable income (the amount of income upon which the income tax is
levied) by a certain amount, thereby providing tax savings or benefits.
202. I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (2010).
203. Hartman, supra note 26, at 189.
204. I.R.C. § 195 (2010).
205. Hartman, supra note 26, at 192.
206. See Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 497–98.
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symptomatic.207 As such, it is evident that depending on the
nature of the disease, the use of travel restrictions may be more
or less useful. The ability of phase-out provisions to allow poli-
cy makers to customize regulatory provisions would clearly be
useful in this context. Therefore, phase-out provisions can be a
tool that the WHO can utilize to refine its provisions to have
the exact effect that they choose by drafting them in a way that
would make them more specialized to the particular IIDE at
issue.
The process of implementing this framework would entail the
WHA and its supporting agencies analyzing the types of health
measures and the degrees of those health measures that are
effective in combatting different classes of diseases that have
similar characteristics. What would ultimately come of this
analysis would be phase-out provisions that indicate under
what circumstances travel bans and other travel restrictions
are both feasible and scientifically proven to be effective. They
would indicate that once the veracity of a particular IIDE
reaches a certain threshold, then the provision allowing for a
particular health measure—in this instance, a travel re-
striction—will or will not be effective, and thus mandated or
forbidden by the IHR. The referent in such provisions, which
would determine whether the provision is applicable given the
relevant IIDE, would be, for example, one or several of the fol-
lowing: the number of disease cases,208 the manner in which
the IIDE is communicated,209 the number of affected countries,
the rate of spread of the IIDE, or the nature of the contaminat-
ed region or regions.
Another manner in which phase-out provisions could be uti-
lized within the IHR is by using characteristics of infected
countries as referents. A meeting on improving the public
health regime in Ebola-affected countries in December of 2014,
stated the importance of “[t]he required actions . . . be[ing] tai-
lored to each countries specific context.”210 As such, factors such
207. Statement from the Travel and Transport Task Force on Ebola Virus
Disease Outbreak in West Africa, supra note 49.
208. See Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at 498.
209. See Statement from the Travel and Transport Task Force on Ebola Vi-
rus Disease Outbreak in West Africa, supra note 49.
210. High Level Meeting on Building Resilient Systems for Health in Ebola-
Affected Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 10–11, 2014),
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as the geographical character, infrastructure, socioeconomics of
the infected regions,211 or a country’s proximity to the infected
region, could be used as referents for determining when a par-
ticular health measure is appropriate.
The use of actual figures and thresholds in structuring the
IHR would provide more specificity in regards to when and how
Member States should implement certain health measures.
This method of regulating would help to ensure that the health
measures implemented by Member States are not only con-
sistent with the purpose of the Regulation, but also consistent
with the most up-to-date findings of the WHO, the WHA, and
the GARs. Even if a Member State fails to precisely follow
these phase-out provisions, they will still be provided with a
useful tool, as these phase-out provisions would act as a
framework illustrating when a specific health measure will or
will not be effective.
2. Sunset Provisions
An additional feature of the proposed provisions, which will
increase both the effectiveness and integrity of the IHR, is that
the provisions would sunset. Sunset provisions are statutory
provisions that have an expiration date, and will thus not re-
main in effect after such date, unless they are renewed by the
relevant legislative or governing body. 212 Examples of these
provisions were seen during the Bush Administration, when
President George W. Bush instituted a tax cut in 2001, which
was set to expire in 2010, and another tax cut in 2003, which
was set to expire in 2013.213
Sunset provisions are both an encouraged and criticized
method of legislating. On one hand, sunset provisions are seen
as beneficial because they force legislative bodies to reconsider
laws that they have previously passed and initiate conversation
about the successes, failures, and potential improvements of a
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/health-systems/health-systems-
background.pdf.
211. See id.
212. Finn, supra note 25, at 445.
213. Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEGAL AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2004,
http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-
2004/story_mooney_janfeb04.msp. These provisions are referred to as “sun-
set” provisions because of their predetermined expiration date. Finn, supra
note 25, at 445.
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particular piece of legislation.214 Supporters of such provisions
have also advocated for their use due to the “flexibility they of-
fer to legislators when dealing with temporary or uncertain
problems.”215 On the other hand, sunset provisions have been
criticized for creating a system by which legislators are in more
frequent contact with lobbyists, thereby exposing them to
greater influence from interest groups than from ordinary citi-
zens.216 An advantage of using sunset provisions within the
context of an international treaty such as the IHR, however, is
that such a prevailing political atmosphere does not exist,217 as
it does within the politically charged realm of tax legislation.218
Therefore, the use of sunset provisions in the IHR would solely
function to maintain the dynamic nature of the Regulation by
setting dates upon which certain provisions expire and new
and updated provisions are developed to replace them.
The WHO already does, however, employ a form of sunset
provisions through its use of temporary recommendations to
regulate the actions of Member States “temporarily” in the
wake of an international health emergency on a “risk specific”
basis.219 For purposes of this Note, however, sunset provisions
will not refer to temporary regulations published by a legisla-
tive body during a state of emergency like those utilized in the
WHO’s temporary recommendations. Sunset provisions will
instead refer to fully developed provisions formulated in ad-
vance of any type of health emergency, which will have an am-
ply considered sunset date that takes into consideration the
pace at which new scientific developments arise that modify
and enhance international response to IIDEs. This way, in-
stead of Member States scrambling to abide by the temporary
recommendations published by the WHO when a state of emer-
gency already exists, they will have more time to properly de-
liberate and consider the appropriate methods of preventing
the spread of an IIDE.
214. Finn, supra note 25, at 447; Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1014–15 (2011).
215. Kysar, supra note 214, at 1041.
216. Id. at 1051.
217. See Silver, supra note 116, at 245.
218. See Kysar, supra note 214, at 1051.
219. See Finn, supra note 25, at 450; IHR (2005), supra note 19, art. 1 (de-
fining “temporary recommendation”).
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Furthermore, Member States will also have sufficient time to
both implement measures and create domestic policies with the
guidance of an increasingly specific framework of phase-out
provisions, thus promoting a more globalized and coherent in-
ternational approach. This additional time would also allow
countries to coordinate their response strategies in conjunction
with one another in advance, which has been a heavily cri-
tiqued area of international health response that health offi-
cials emphasized after analyzing the effectiveness of the IHR
during the 2014 Ebola outbreak.220
This increased coordination in advance of a health emergency
would promote preparedness, which, in this context, would de-
crease human rights infringements by decreasing the level of
urgency that exists during such times. It would also promote
meaningful discussions and cooperation between neighboring
Member States and Member States that collectively engage in
international commerce, so that their reactions to health emer-
gencies are less detrimental to the political and economic rela-
tionships that exist between them. Essentially, with additional
time allocated to protecting human rights, state sovereignty,
and the international economy before a threat to international
health arises, these important tenets will no longer fall to the
wayside during times of crisis, but instead will be firmly rooted
by the time an international health crisis emerges.
B. Scientific Application of the Sunsetting Phase-Out Provisions
in the Context of the SARS, H1N1, and Ebola Crises.
In attempts to provide a concrete context to understand how
this framework would increase the effectiveness of the IHR, the
following section will compare characteristics of the last three
major health emergencies: the 2003 SARS outbreak, the 2009
H1N1 outbreak, and the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Using these pri-
or outbreaks as a basis, this section will then simulate how this
Note’s individualized approach would better cater to different
types of IIDEs and present an overview of the various scientific
studies that provide support for the validity of this Note’s pro-
posal.
220. Health Partners Unite to Build Stronger Systems for Health in Ebola-
Affected Countries, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 12, 2014),
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2014/health-systems-
ebola/en/.
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1. SARS
In 2002, the SARS epidemic221 commenced in Guangdong,
China.222 As a respiratory illness, the disease is transmitted
through “respiratory droplets” that are expelled by infected
persons when they cough or sneeze.223 The disease has an incu-
bation period of two to seven days, meaning that it would take
from the time of a person’s first contact with the infection until
the end of the of incubation period to actually experience the
symptoms of the disease, and in the case of SARS, transmit
it.224
The emergence and spread of SARS throughout the world
was heavily linked to air travel.225 The outbreak originated
with a doctor who was exposed to the disease while treating a
patient that was infected.226 The doctor then stayed in a hotel
in Hong Kong, where he was believed to have infected roughly
sixteen other hotel guests who then proceeded to spread the
disease across borders to airplane passengers on their respec-
tive flights home.227 These hotel guests are believed to have in-
fected multiple people while in flight, causing SARS to spread
to Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada.228 Researchers also found
that the passengers on the plane who were most at risk of con-
tracting the disease from the infected person were those that
were seated within three rows in front of them.229 The SARS
outbreak was eventually tempered in July of 2003, but caused
8098 to be infected and 774 deaths.230
221. At the time the 2002 SARS epidemic took place, the original unrevised
version of the IHR was in force, and it was the events that occurred in re-
sponse to the epidemic that actually spurred the revision process. Fidler su-
pra note 52, at 343.
222. Joshua D. Reader, The Case Against China: Establishing International
Liability for China’s Response to the 2002-2003 SARS Epidemic, 19 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 519, 525 (2006).
223. Frequently Asked Questions About SARS, CTR. FORDISEASE CONTROL&
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.html (last updated July 2,
2012).
224. Id.
225. Clegg supra note 28, at 440.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Air Travel ‘Fueled SARS Spread’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3329483.stm.
230. Frequently Asked Questions About SARS, supra note 228.
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2. H1N1
H1N1, also known as “swine flu,” is a respiratory illness
caused by a specific strain of the influenza virus that is ordi-
narily found in pigs.231 Symptoms of the disease are very simi-
lar to those of the seasonal flu including: fever, headache,
cough, sore throat, body aches, fatigue nausea, and runny nose.
What made H1N1 particularly threatening, however, was its
ability to ignite or complicate dormant or preexisting health
conditions, causing other fatal diseases such as pneumonia and
respiratory or kidney failure.232 The average incubation period
for the disease is four days, and becomes contagious one day
before the onset of symptoms and continues to be contagious for
up to five to seven days after such date.233
The most recent outbreak of pandemic influenza (H1N1) took
place in 2009 and was first detected in Mexico. Within roughly
a month, the disease had spread to the United States, Canada,
Spain, and the United Kingdom.234 While the outbreak turned
out to be much less severe than the international community
and the WHO expected,235 recorded deaths were still significant
as they reached 18,500 deaths. 236 The Director-General de-
clared the H1N1 outbreak to be a PHEIC on April 25, 2009,237
and on September 23, issued temporary recommendations,
which included the advisement that “countries should not close
borders or restrict international traffic and trade.”238 However,
231. Information on Swine Influenza/Variant Influenza Viruses, CTR. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (May 15, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/swineflu/index.htm.
232. Interim Guidance on Infection Control, Measures for 2009 H1N1 Influ-
enza in Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Personnel,
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (July 15, 2010, 12:30 PM),
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/guidelines_infection_control.htm#d; World Health
Org., Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005), WHO
Doc. A64/10, at 49, 57–58 (May 5, 2011),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA64/A64_10-en.pdf [hereinafter
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notwithstanding this recommendation, many countries insti-
tuted travel restrictions in hopes they would protect their
populations from contamination.239
3. Ebola
Ebola, an often-fatal virus, first emerged in Africa in 1976.240
Although curable if properly treated, it can lead to wide-spread
fatal epidemics.241 Symptoms of the virus include the following:
fever, vomiting, muscle pain, and internal and/or external
bleeding.242 The disease is contagious once an infected person
becomes symptomatic and is transmitted to others through
their contact with the bodily fluids of an infected person.243 The
incubation period for Ebola ranges from two to twenty-one
days. However, an infected person is not incapable of spreading
the disease during the incubation period.244
4. Support
The scientific findings of prior outbreaks provide support for
the proposed framework of sunsetting phase-out provisions. As
previously evidenced, each disease, its effects, and its trans-
mission, is unique.245 As such, it is apparent that the probabil-
ity that different diseases will spread during air travel is stag-
gered depending on the method of and susceptibility to trans-
mission. For example, a disease like Ebola, which is not suscep-
tible to airborne transmission, would have a lesser chance of
239. See HUMANITARIAN CRISES AND MIGRATION, supra note 12, at 104; Ba-
jardi et al., supra note 15.
240. Ebola Virus Disease, supra note 159.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. For example, Ebola is spread through contact with the bodily fluids of
an infected person that is symptomatic, SARS is transmitted through air-
borne respiratory droplets of an infected person after the incubation period,
and H1N1 is spread through close contact with infected persons or contact
with the respiratory droplets of an infected person that may or may not be
symptomatic. Id.; Frequently Asked Questions About SARS, supra note 228;
Interim Guidance on Infection Control, Measures for 2009 H1N1 Influenza in
Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Personnel, supra note
240; No Rationale for Travel Restrictions, WORLDHEALTHORG. (May 1, 2009),
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/swineflu/guidance/public_health/travel_advice
/en/.
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spread during travel 246 than other diseases, such as SARS,
which is spread through the airborne respiratory droplets of a
symptomatic individual, which may have an increased chance
of spread during air travel. Further complicating the issue are
situations like H1N1 where someone can be contagious even
before someone becomes symptomatic.247
As a result, the measures to prevent such worldwide epidem-
ics must be made adaptable to these distinct traits. The Direc-
tor-General of the WHO expressed a similar sentiment during
her address to the Review Committee in August of 2015, re-
garding the 2014 Ebola outbreak when she stated that
“[p]reparedness for the future means preparedness for a very
severe disease that spreads via the airborne route or can be
transmitted during the incubation period, before an infected
person shows tell-tale signs of the illness.”248 With this state-
ment, the Director-General acknowledges that the IHR does
not sufficiently equip the Member States to respond effectively
to every type of IIDE, and that a disease susceptible to airborne
spread, during its incubation period, would be particularly
threatening given the lack of tools that the Member States cur-
rently possess.
Analyzing more closely these discrepancies and metrics are
various studies that evaluate the ultimate effects of travel re-
strictions upon the spread of IIDEs, given different disease ep-
idemics and surrounding circumstances. For example, one
study utilized data from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and the im-
plementation of travel bans in Mexico, to simulate the effect
that reductions in travel to and from regions affected by IIDEs
have upon the spread of IIDEs during international health
emergencies. This study found that such travel restrictions re-
sulted in a 40 percent decrease in travel and only delayed the
246. WHO: Air Travel is Low-risk for Ebola Transmission, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2014/ebola-
travel/en/.
247. No Rationale for Travel Restrictions, supra note 245. Although the
WHO stated that there was no purpose for instituting travel restrictions in
response to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, they said so based on the rationale that
the disease had already spread to numerous countries, not on the grounds
that the disease had a low risk of transmission during air travel per se. Id.
248. Margaret Chan, WHO Director-General Addresses the Review Commit-
tee of the International Health Regulations Focused on the Ebola Response,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://www.who.int/dg/speeches/2015/review-committee-ihr-ebola/en/.
2016] Travel Restrictions and the IHR 821
import of the first case of H1N1 from Mexico to other countries
for less than three days.249 The study solidified its conclusions
about the insignificant effects of the use of travel restrictions
during IIDEs by further adding that “even given the unlikely
assumption of a 90% travel reduction, the resulting delay [in
the import of the first case of H1N1 from Mexico to other coun-
tries] would be on the order of 2 weeks, confirming results from
previous studies.”250 The WHO appeared to support this finding
during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic by reporting that “[s]cientific
research based on mathematical modeling indicates that re-
stricting travel will be of limited or no benefit in stopping the
spread of disease. Historical records of previous influenza pan-
demics, as well as experience with SARS, have validated this
point.”251
Another study, however, which sought to determine “the util-
ity of travel bans to slow the spread of Ebola,” used data re-
garding the use of travel bans and flight suspensions by air-
lines in response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak to simulate the
effect that an 80 percent reduction in the amount of airline
passenger traffic would have upon the spread of the virus.252
The study found that:
[a]lthough the current travel restrictions postpone the spread
of . . . [Ebola] to other countries by at most a few weeks, they
can impose heavy logistical constraints on the management of
the epidemic in the countries severely hit by the disease and
ill-equipped to cope with its alarming spread . . . . Similar to
what happened during the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) outbreak in 2003, adverse effects on local economies of
the same countries implementing the bans may also occur, as
a reduced connectivity and the increased apprehension may
induce a considerable reduction in the demand for service in-
dustries (business travel, tourism, and associated services).253
Scientific studies, however, have not collectively concluded that
the negative to non-existent impact of travel restrictions upon
the spread of IIDEs is universal or consistent. A study using
mathematical modeling to research the effect travel reductions
249. Bajardi et. al., supra note 15.
250. See id.
251. No Rationale for Travel Restrictions, supra note 245.
252. Gomes et. al., supra note 10.
253. Id. at 5.
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have in infected countries upon the spread of IIDEs found that
where “containment efforts are underway” and the number of
infected persons has not yet reached the thousands, travel re-
strictions can be beneficial in that they would decrease the
probability that an infected person would travel to another
country and spur another outbreak.254
As such, scientific studies and modeling have come to show
that the effectiveness of travel restrictions is dependent not on-
ly upon the extent to which travel restrictions strain the
movement of persons and goods around the world, but also up-
on various other factors that define the context within which
the epidemic arose. Thus, the use of the proposed framework of
sunsetting phase-out provisions in the IHR would allow Mem-
ber States to tailor their responses to each IIDE in a manner
that more specifically caters to the specifics of the particular
epidemic, and the circumstances surrounding it.
5. Implementation
To provide a clear illustration of how this framework would
function in practice, consider the following. In order to deter-
mine the rates at which travel restriction provisions in the IHR
should phase in or phase out, infectious diseases that have
swept the international community in the past should be
grouped together according to relevant characteristics such as
method of transmission, rate of spread, and incubation period.
Once the appropriate groupings have been established, the
provision of the IHR mandating the use of travel restrictions
would be modified to phase in or phase out based on the pres-
ence of particular characteristics that would place the relevant
IIDE within a specific class of disease whose spread would only
be decreased by the implementation of a certain degree of trav-
el restriction. Therefore, in the event that a disease outbreak,
such as the H1N1 pandemic, were to occur, the subsection of
the travel restriction provision Member States should refer to
would be the section that applies to the category of diseases
that are spread through close contact with an infected person
who does not need to be symptomatic to be contagious.255 Pre-
254. Hollingsworth et. al., supra note 10, at 498.
255. See Interim Guidance on Infection Control, Measures for 2009 H1N1
Influenza in Healthcare Settings, Including Protection of Healthcare Person-
nel, supra note 240; No Rationale for Travel Restrictions, supra note 245.
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sumably, considering the high probability of a disease such as
H1N1 to spread during air travel, that category of diseases
would permit the highest permissible use of travel restriction.
Whereas in the case of a disease such as Ebola, that has a
much lower probability of being spread during air travel,256 the
permitted degree of travel restriction would begin to phase out
(or decrease) since the utility of that health measure no longer
exists in that context.257
The sunsetting aspect of these phase-out provisions will take
effect when the existing framework is no longer current or ap-
plicable, considering the strategic and scientific advancements
in the response to and treatment of IIDEs. Therefore, after a
specified number of years, the framework will expire, be modi-
fied, and reinstated in accordance with such advancements.
CONCLUSION
The IHR takes many steps in the right direction in coordinat-
ing an effective international response to IIDEs that upholds
fundamental notions of human rights, respects states’ sover-
eignty, and limits the disruption of the international economy.
However, the IHR’s lack of enforcement and vagueness has
proven problematic and has effectively limited the usefulness of
the IHR during international health emergencies. The pro-
posed framework of sunsetting phase-out provisions would pro-
vide a resource that Member States can extrapolate from in
formulating their immediate responses to international public
health threats in a manner that is consistent with the most
256. See WHO: Air Travel is Low-risk for Ebola Transmission, supra note
246.
257. This is an oversimplified explanation of how the framework of phase-
out provisions would function, however, since other factors such as the pre-
paredness of the region that is affected, the political and socioeconomic cli-
mate of the infected region, and the extent to which the IIDE has already
spread, should also be taken into account in determining when and at what
rate a provision should phase in or out. See Hollingsworth, supra note 10, at
497–98. Tiffany Bogich et al., Preventing Pandemics Via International Devel-
opment: A Systems Approach, PLOSMED., Dec. 2012, at 1; Mark J. Siedner et
al., Strengthening the Detection of and Early Response to Public Health
Emergencies: Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic, PLOS MED.,
Mar. 24, 2015, at 2; Ana LP Mateus et al., Effectiveness of Travel Restrictions
in the Rapid Containment of the Human Influenza: A Systematic Review, 92
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novel and effective methods of combatting the spread of IIDEs.
This transformation of the IHR into a resource for the Member
States will further increase their confidence in the Regulation
and sway Member States away from instinctually shutting
down their borders in favor of implementing health measures
that are most effective in combatting the spread of IIDEs, and
in limiting interferences with the international economy and
human rights.
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